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ABSTRACT 
We challenge the standard argument whach treats collective violence as 
an expression of the dissatisfactions felt by populations experiencing 
hardship after periods of relative well-being. We propose an alternative 
explanation in which struggles for political power are the central fea- 
tures. Tfme-series analysis of year-to-year fluctuations of collective 
violence in France from 1830 through 1960 fail to yield significant re- 
sults for a variety of models designed to represent major arguments in 
the recent literature stressing the effects of short-term hardship. 
Similar analyses representing the effects of governmental repression 
yield results corresponding to our .expectations. So far we have not 
been able to incorporate adequate measurements of the other major power- 
struggle.variables into the time-series analysis. But we take the results 
of this preliminary investigation as a warrant to continue in that direc- 
t ion. 
HARDSHIP @D COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE I N  F W C E ,  1830 . t0 .1960  
ConsSdering . .. t h e  s c a t t e r e d ,  unsys temat ic  and con t r ad ic to ry  c h a r a c t e r  
of t h e  a v a i l a b l e  evidence,  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  ha rdsh ip  causes c o l l e c t i v e  vio- 
l ence  has  gained s u r p r i s i n g  currency.  I n  r e c e n t  yea r s  few s c h o l a r s  have 
propounded a simple mechanical r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  two. Y e t  a t  l e a s t  
one v a r i a n t  of t h e  no t ion  has  a c t u a l l y  gained adherents .  That i s  t h e  
exp lana t ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  (and o t h e r  forms of p r o t e s t  o r  re -  
b e l l i o n ,  whether v i o l e n t  o r  n o t )  as a  response t o  a  gap between expecta- 
t i o n s  and achievements. That exp lana t ion  can e a s i l y  be made t r u e  by 
d e f i n i t i o n  -- f o r  example, by l e t t i n g  t h e  v io l ence  i t s e l f  s tand  a s  t h e  
fvidence of un rea l i zed  expec ta t ions .  It can a l s o  be made i r r e f u t a b l e  
but  t r i v i a l ,  simply by au tho r i z ing  a n . e t e r n a 1  sea rch  f o r  one mqre gap 
t o  account f o r  t h e  v io l ence  a$ hand. There Is, however, a  c r e d i b l e ,  
weighty and sometimes t e s t a b l e  form of t h e  argument which reasons from 
short-run pardship  t o  p r o t e s t  v i a  t h e  cumulation of i n d i v i d u a l  d i s s a t i s -  
' I 
f a c t i o n s .  
We cha l lenge  t h e  e n t i r e  l i n e  of argument. Men do, indeed,  o f t e n  
become angry when o t h e r  people v i o l a t e  t h e i r  expec ta t ions .  Under some 
cond i t i ons  short-run hardship  does,  we concede, p r e c i p i t a t e  r e b e l l i o n .  
But we do no t  t h ink  t h e r e  is any gene ra l  connect ion between c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  and hardship  such t h a t  an observer  could p r e d i c t  one from t h e  
o t h e r .  We doubt t h a t  t h e  d i v e r s e - e v e n t s  which go by t h e  names of p r o t e s t ,  
c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  r e b e l l i o n  and v io l ence  have anything more i n  common 
than  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a u t h o r i t i e s  disqpprove of them. And we.suppose t h a t  
the principal, immediate causes of collective violence are political: 
collective violence results from changes.in the relations between groups 
of men and the major concentrations of coercive power in their environ. 
ments. 
This paper says little about the political analysis of collective 
violence, and-much about hardship..-.Here.we seek merely to show that 
plausible versions of the expectation-achievement argument fail to explain 
a 
the year-to-year fluctuation..in collective violence over an important 
span of one country's history, while one eminently political variable -- 
the extent of governmental repression -- does provide a partial explana- 
tion of that fluctuation. Other reports of our.work lay out the political 
analysis more fully, provide some-evidence of its validity, and.treat'a 
number of alternative argumentsnot mentioned here. We do not think 1 .  
for a moment that this particular-investigation disposes of all possible 
relationships between collective violence and hardship,. or that it comes 
close to establishing the priority.of politics. At .our most expansive, 
we claim no more than to have lodged enough doubts against the expectation- 
achievement theories of collective violence to recommend a moratorium on 
their use as explanations until they have received further tests, and to 
have provided enough support for a .political-process theory.to justify 
the investment .of new efforts in.its.elaboration and verification. 
Lest we.be suspected of battling straw ben, let us mention a few 
much-cited statements which fo1low:the line of argument we.reject. 
James C. Davies begins by.speaking.about revolutions, but soon,extends his 
formulation to a wide. variety of violent events: ". . . revolution is most 
likely to take place.when a prolonged.period or.rising expectations and 
rising gratifications is.followed by a.short period of sharp reversal, 
during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly 
. . 
widens and becomes intolerable;. The frustration that develops, when it 
is intense and .widespread in the society, seeks outlets in violent action." 
(Davies 1969: 547; see also Dav.ies 1962, 1971). In,addition to revolutions 
in a strict sense of the term, Davies. explicitly applies the scheme to 
draft riots, student protests, the "Black Rebellion of the 1960s" and the 
Nazi seizure of power. Despite his insistence that the definitive evidence 
for this argument must come from observations of attitudes, he is willing 
to use changes in income, education, economic growth, farm productivity 
and civil rights as indicators-of expectations and gratifications. More 
important for present purposes, in.analyzing the Nazis and several other 
cases, he offers evidence of rapid economic decline after long expansion 
as substantiation of his argument. 
Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend (1966) offer two formulations which are 
germane to the relationship between hardship and collective violence. 
First, they argue in essence that the higher the ratio of want formation 
to want satisfaction, the greater a country's propensity to "instability." 
In one study, literacy and urbanization represented want formation, GNP, 
caloric intake, physicians, telephones, newspapers and radios represented 
want satisfaction, and thirty different domestic conflict measures for 
1955 to 1961 -- ten of them explicitly involving damage' to persons or 
objects, and a number of others iidplying it.-- went into the index of 
instability. Second, they propose that "the faster (the slower) the rate 
of change in the modernization process within any given society, the higher 
(the lower) the level of political=instability within that society." 
(Feierabend and Feierabend.1966:. 263) In this case, the yearly percent 
rate of change from 1935 through.1962 in caloric intake, literacy, 
primary and postprimary education, national income, cost of living, infant 
mortality, urbanization and radios per thousand population served as 
indicators of the rapidity of modernization. This time there were two 
measures of instability: a) the aggregate index mentioned earlier, 
b) the variance of that index over single years from 1955 through 1961. 
Their formulation differs from Davies', but it clearly permits predictions 
from fluctuations in economic well-being to levels of collective violence. 
Ted Gurr, finally, proposes .that "...a psychological variable, rela- 
tive deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, 
and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of 
. . . . . ... .. a population, the greater is. the..magnitude of strife in one or another 
form." (Gurr 1968: 1104; see also.Gurr 1969, 1970) Gurr's models and 
measurements are more elaborate than-those of Davies or the Feierabends. 
For present purposes, the essential argument is that both persisting and 
short-term deprivation have direct, positive effects on the magnitude of 
civil strife, with allowance .for the effects of legitimacy, coercive 
potential and soc i a l - s t r uc tu r a l . f a c i1 i t a t i on .  "Persisting deprivation" 
combines weighted measures of- economic discrimination, political discrim- 
ination, potential separatism, dependence on private foreign capital, 
religious cleavages and lack of educational opportunity. l1Short-term.dep- 
rivation" combines declines in foreign trade, inflation, declining rates 
of growth in GNP, qualitative-.reports of.adverse economic conditions, 
new restrictions on political participation and representation and new 
"value-depriving policies of governments". "Magnitude of civil strife" 
cumulates and weights information about individual conflicts, most of them 
involving attacks on persons or objects. (We will neglect the complicated 
measurements of legitimacy, coercive.potentia1 and social-structural 
facilitation, although they raise intriguing and serious methodological 
problems.) Gurr, toorreasons from short-run hardship to protest via 
the cumulation of individua1,dissatisfactions. 
Although these investigations.,are open to serious.attack on theoretical, 
technical and substantive grounds, we will not offer a critical assessment 
of them here.* Our purpose in sketching the three arguments and their 
implementation is to provide a rationale for our own choice of models and 
indexes representing the line of reasoning we wish to challenge. We,have 
taken one critical segment of the expectation-achievement argument, 
sought to represent it in terms fdthful to the usual formulation of that 
argument, and tried to test it -thoroughly against excellent data con- 
cerning year-to-year fluctuations in collective violence within one country 
over a long period of time. In theLresearch reported here, we have not 
represented "expectations" in any "direct or convincing way. We have, in- 
stead, inferred changing expectations from fluctuating "achievements" in 
a manner similar to that sometimes employed by Gurr, Davies and many other 
advocates of expectation-achievement explanations of collective violence. 
All the data are yearly aggregate measures for France during the 
period from 1830 through 1960. Our measure of collective violence is the 
estimated number of participants in disturbances.in continental France 
as a whole. Disturbances are continuous interactions involving at.least 
one group of fifty qr more persons in the course of which someone seized 
or damaged persons or objects over resistence.   hey exclude acts.of 
3 
international war. The disturbances studied consist of every event,meet- 
ing our criteria detected by trained readers of two national newspapers 
for each day from 1830 through 1860 and 1930 through 1960, plus each day 
of a randomly-selected three months per year from 1861 through 1929. 
Once events qualified in this way, we collected information about them 
frpm a wide variety of sources: other newspapers, published court pro- 
ceedings, .annual reviews of politics. French national and departmental 
archives, secondary historical works, and others. We then recorded a,: , 
great many characteristics of the disturbances, including estimates of the . 
number of participants, in machine-readable, form. In order to produCe 4 
. a continuous series.over the 131 year period, we have performed two 
extrapolations' which tend to .reduce the variance somewhat: 1) we have 
' . estimated the number of participantqin the roughly 6 percent of disturb- 
ances where we had insufficient information for a numerical estimate as 
the mean of all those others in .the same year that we were able to estimate 
numerically; 2) we'quadrupled our annual figures for the period from 
1861 through 1929, in which we..had studied only a quarter of all the months. 
Altogether, then, we are dealing with 1,989 disturbances and an estimated 
3.2 million participants. 
As one might expect, the number of disturbances and the number of 
participants vary greatly from one year to another, but vary closely 
together. Figure 1 represents the numbers of.disturbances and of par- 
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ticipants in.five-year moving averages for easy legibility. (The analysis 
itself, however, uses single-year data.) As the figure shows, very high 
levels of collective violence came around the revolutions of 1830 and 
1848, at the beginning of the twentieth century and in the mid-1930s, 
while exceptionally low levels prevailed in the 1850s and during the 
two World Wars. Sometimes the transition came abruptly. In the extreme 
case, there were 93 disturbances and some,90,600 participants in.1851, 
followed by 2 disturbances and an estimated 950 participants in 1852. 
Without exception the large, abrupt shifts of this kind mark a major re- 
arrangement of the national structure of political power in France. In- 
'1851-52, the crucial events were Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat, the wide- 
spread but unsuccessful insurrection it incited, and the installation of 
a.police state under the man who was. to become Napoleon 111. 
Our indicators of hardship and well-being are all economic: 1) an 
index of food prices, 2) an index of prices of manufactured goods, 3) an 
index of industrial production. Following the usual practice in ex- 
pectation-achievement -investigations, we take high levels on the first 
two variables and low levels .on the third as indicating hardship for the 
population as a whole. More precisely, we accept,short-run rises in 
prices and declines in industrial production as evidence of increasing 
hardship.   he conventional argument, which we adopt for the purposes of 

this inquiry, is that the population compares current experience with that 
of the immediate past, and therefore suffers "relative deprivation" when 
. . 
the economy turns down. Davies and Gurr, among many others, use that . . 
reasoning explicitly; it also seems consistent with the arguments of the 
groups of cross-sectional studies represented here by the work of the 
Feierabends. 
We make our test of this argument in a roundabout way: not by con- 
structing a single model and rejecting the argument if the model fails, 
but by.testing a - set of models incorporating the,relative-deprivation 
argument. If none of these models.fits, we can safely reject (for our data) 
the usual versions of.the argument. Since our.data are measured over 
time, we have employed econometric time-series techniques. Each of these 
series -- the participant in dis.turbances and the econo'mic .indicators -- 
manifests a trend verified by the non-parametric techniques described in 
Malinvaud (1966: 390-92). We "detrended" the series using the method of 
first differences (b X=X :-X :-I), for these reasons : 1) only complicated t t 
and intuitively meaningless polynomial expressions could,account for the 
trend in these relatively long -time-series; 2) Detrending using first 
differences reduces the seriaL-correlation.of the residuals; and 3) most 
importantly, -detrending usipg first-di.fferences.rather than fitting a. 
polyndmial function of time is more faithful to current theories of rela- 
tive deprivation.' By .including a polynomial expression for trend, we 
would in fact .by treating as ."deprivation years" any years (and only those 
years) where, for example, obser.vations on.the price index were above the 
predicted value.' So, in effect, our deprivation measure would depend 
on -the magnitude (and more importantly, on. the sign) .of the difference 
from the trend expression, but not,necessarily on the-difference from the 
preceding year (the measure which the theory implies). The method of 
first differences, by measuring relative deprivation as the change from 
one.year to the next, erases this problem. 
Our first model is one which specifies all of the economic.,deprivation 
predictors as independent variables, of.the following form: 
where 
Z = number of participants in.disturbances 
W = price of food index 
X = price of.manufactured goods index 
Y =.index of industrial production 
t.= time 
u = error or residual term 
These letter-variable combinations will remain constant,throughout this 
section. 
We compute the regression and correlations:. 
Regression: A Z = 622.5 +.13.09AWt +.0.75AX - 626.510Yt + u(t); 
t t 
Multiple Correlation Coefficient: 0.0270 F3,107 = 0.3539, 0.55 
coefficient of Determination: . 0.0007 
Standard Error of Estimate: 57,791.4 
Neither the analysis of variance for the multiple correlation, nor the 
coefficients of any of the indicators of deprivation are significantly 
different from zero. (We use a critical level of 0.05 throughout this 
paper.) Furthermore, the serial correlation of the residuals is quite 
large (0.5304), despite the fact that the first differences method is 
designed to reduce this correlation. By not being able to account for 
the serial correlation ,with this model, we are in effect saying that there 
are other (non-economic) variables which can explain some of the system- 
atic variation left in the residuals. 
Despite the fact that the multiple regression model does not fit 
the data, a model is more than the sum of its parts. The magnitude (and 
even the sign) of partial slopes and the significance level often change 
with the inclusion or exclusion of certain independent variables. 
Therefore, it is possible that certain of these deprivation indicators 
could predict collective violence separately. With this in mind', we 
construct the following models, again using first differences, to ascertain 
whether or not any single deprivation indicator can predict significantly 
the number of participants ip disturbances: 
1) A Zt = bO1 ti b l 1 ~ W t  + U' (t); 
2) a Zt = bO" + bl "axt + u" (t); 
3) D Zt = bo'" + bll"~Y; + u'" (t). 
None of the analyses of variance for the multiple correlations in any 
of these models is.significantly different from zero; nor are any of.the 
coefficients significantly different from zero. In,all these cases serial 
correlation of the residuals is relatively high (at least 0.36), indicating 
once again the existence of variables accounting for systematic variation 
which we have not yet taken into account. 
On another tack, we can learn a great deal about the relatipnships 
between the indicators of hardship and our indicator of the magnitude 
of collective violence by looking at their intercorrelationg gver time, 
Based on the writings of the proponents of the hardship-violence linkage, 
we would predict the following about these relationships: 1) The cor- 
relation between changes in the price of food index and changes in the 
number of participaets should be positive-and,the time lag zero or one 
year, unless the price of food rises rapidly.over a period of years, in 
which case there may be a cumulative effect. 2) The lag between changes 
in the price of manufactured goods .and. changes in the magqitGde of violence 
might. be anywhere from one to five years, since manufactured goods are 
not such an immediate necessity..as-food; the expected sign of the correla- 
tion is positive. 3) The lag in the correlation between changes in the 
index of industrial production- (as a qrude measure of business conditions) 
and changeg in the ndmber of participants can't be predicted in apvance. 
Table 1 about here 
what in fact do the data look like (see Table l)? The correlation 
between changes in the price of food index and changes in the number of 
participants in disturbances is virtually zero for all lagsllead,~ within 
the boundaries considered. Similarly, the correlation between changes in 
TABLE 1 
INTERCORRELATIONS OVER TIME OF ECONOMIC. DEPRIVATION INDICATORS AND NUMBER 
OR PARTICIPANTS IN DISTURBANCES 
TIME (LAGILEAD) : 
Number of 2- 
















Minus signs following entries intthe "time" column indicate that thecolumn 
variables ( A  W , AX , A Y ) are. lagged .on. (precede) the participants 
t t variable by the desqpatei number of years. A plus sign following the 
time entry designates a lead. 
Data from the years 1830-1912; 1920-1938, 1949-1954: 108 observations. 
in the price of manufactured goods. index and 'changes in, the number of 
participants is close to zero for all lags/leads except the unlagged 
correlation.(lag zero: r = +.1067).. However, we have already.tested a 
'model which attempted to predict the yearly difference in the number of 
participants in disturbances from the yearly difference in the price 
index of manufactured goods at lag zero, and found,no significant relation- 
ship between the two variables. 
The correlation between changes in the index of industrial produc- 
tion and changes ,in the number of participants is greatest ,in the ex- 
pected (negative) direction for a..lag of two,years (r =.-.1374). There- 
fore we.construct the following equation, taking account of what appears 
to be, a two year lag in the relationship: A Z  = bo + blAy + u(t); .t t-2 
However, neither the analysis of -variance for the multiple correlation 
. . 
nor the coefficient of the independent variable is significantly different 
from zero (for both, p( 0.16). ' ... . . . . 
This last procedure has been quite artificial; where intercorrelations 
ove'r time seeuied to be relatively. .large and in the ,direction expected by 
the relative deprivation theory,-we have constructed models which, by 
Choosing the time lag with the highest cprrelati6n,havi given the economic 
deprivation indicators the best- possible chance of predicting the ,magnitude 
of collective violence. And yet, - none of .the models we have tested has 
yielded-a relationship between our economic deprivation indicators and 
our indicator of the magnitude of collective violence significantly differ- 
. . 
ent from zero. The evidence is so clear it hardly needs laying out.' The 
theories of a linkage between relative deprivation and collective violence 
propounded by Davies, Gurr and many others can safely be rejected for 
these data. 
The alternative theories which we favor treat collective violence 
as a ,by-product of struggles for political power. We will not. lay out our 
arguments in.detail,here, since we are not yet in a position to represent 
all the variables involved in time-series format. The central ideas are 
simple. Within any substantial population there.is likely to be.at least 
one structure whose.members control major means of.coercion which are. 
effective in that population; .to. the extent that the structure is formal 
and differentiated, we call it. a-govekment. Within some specified 
period, a.number of groups varying in coherence and strength collectively 
apply resources to influence the actions of.the government; they are con: 
tenders for power. No group contends for power without having mobilized -- 
having acquired collective control over resources -- and mobilization is 
a relatively rare and difficult .process. Some of the contenders,have 
routine means of influencing the.government, of influencing each other, 
and of exerting collective control over which groups belong to their 
number; we consider them members of the polity. Groups enter.and 1eave.a 
polity through a continuous process of testing: meeting or failing to meet 
criteria over which the existing members of the polity exercise control. 
The ability to.mobliize extensive..resources.-- especially manpower and 
coercive resources -- is almost always prominent among the criteria. 
Occasionally a revolution fragments the polity for a time; more rarely, 
the revolution produces a new polity by replacing some or all of the exist- 
ing members, or by. constituting a.new government. 
Collective violence, then, tends .to occur when one,group lays a 
claim to a set of resources, and at least one other group resists that 
claim. Existing members of the polity frequently resist via agencies 
of the government, especially troops, police and other specialists in 
coercion. Where governments have substantial force at their disposal, 
in fact? . thoee specialists ordinarily do the major part of the damaging 
and seizing which constitutes the .collective violence. High levels of 
governmental repression, however, increase the costs of .collective action. 
They thereby decrease the likelihood that groups will mobilize and make 
claims which are unacceptable .-to. existing members of the polity. Repression 
thus reduces the extent of collective violence. 
These extremely general statements say nothing about the conditions 
under which different kinds of groups mobilize and contend for power, 
what sorts of claims precipitate violent resistance, how the form of gov- 
ernment patters, and'so on through much.of the agenda set for us by the 
study of struggles' for power. They nevertheless point away from expec- 
tation-achievement accounts of collective violence, except to the extent 
that the gap between expectations and achievements for the population as 
a.whole predicts to the extent of mobilization, repression and contention 
for power. We do not think that extent is very great; the analysis.we have 
just reported confirms us in that .belief. Our argument gives priority to 
conditions which facilitate or hinder mobilization, which change the 
frequency. of :contested- claims; and which-.govern:-the- extent--.and character 
. .  . of gove.m&ptd- .repression. .. . ... - 
- -. In the-:present:analysis, we.concentrate"on.repression, as represented 
. . in-. the %.governmentJ.s.' response. to::.collective--'ac.tfonn. by contenders for power. 
..- . . . r . . In- modern- Eur~pean.history, .one:.ofr:t,her mare:, striking. facts is.::,the low 
. . .  . . ' ' level: of;:co3lective violence (as-.. conventionally. defined: .we are perfectly 
. , .  aware .-of-:war..:and governmental; terror.) under .hch repressive regimes as 
. . .  . those. of 'the. Nazis ,:. the ItaLian Fascists. or: Primo de .Rivera in Spain. 
. . The.key relationship is surelyi.the. ef:fect of repression on collective 
action by non-members of the polity,.-rather than, say, the increased cost 
of thg calculated use of violence against the government. 
. ,If the government permits-the organization of large public gatherings 
. . ;. . . . . and. demonstrations-,. all- other things being equal, we expect; the magni~ude 
of collective violence to relatively:.high;- If the government represses 
., . ... a . thesp. coP2ective actions,; on.-.the .bther?hand., the: magnitude. of: collective 
. . 
. . . - . . . -viglgnce~ilhould be low-' :In::t+ extreme case &ere. most. forms. of association 
' ( labor~unio~q;profess ional  organizations, political parties and the like) 
. - - aye outlawed,.-3s was the case.during.the early part of Loyis Napoleon's 
. . :. 1 reign:.+. -dur,ing :the- German-:Occupatiorx in'.F-rance.;: then -we--expect .virtually 
. .. . .  . ,no. ~col~ecrtive~.vio-lence., In .simph.. terms., .we:'axpect a negative -relationship 
.between go~rnmentql~repressi~n~ and: the. magnttude of collective violence, 
. . . . : .We p~,op.ose.:to test' this .ar;gument.. fo,r.. France with an- elementary model 
- encompassing- the period from 1830. to. 1960. The estimated number- of par- 
ticipants in.disturbances is again aur..indicator.of the magnitude of col- 
lective violence for each year. The ratio of the number arrested in 
disturbances to the number participating is our measure of repression, 
on the following argument: 1) a larger proportion of arrests indicates 
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the presence of more repressive forces -- especially police and troops -- 
at disturbances; 2) so far as we can tell from our study of accounts of. 
disturbances, it also indicates the earlier presence of repressive forces 
at the site of collective action, which in turn indicates the gpvernment's 
advance preparation for the event;.when police and troops arrive after 
the fact, fewer arrests appear to occur. Where most forms of association 
are illegal, the early presence of-.repressive forces at public gatherings 
is almost assured. In this sense, the proportion of arrests to partic- 
ipants measures the general repressiveness of the government. 
How can we test the argument? Our model.would be the following: 
Pt = bo + bl(Q/PIt + ~(t), 
where P = the number of participants per year 
Q'= the number of arrests per year 
t = time 
u = error or residual term 
These letter-variable combinations will be consistent through this section. 
. . '  
One statistical problem arises:. Built into the model is the constraint 
that as P increases, the ratio-. (QIP). decreases. However, we can alleviate 
this problem by including a trend.-term for both variables (P and QIP), 
. .. and then, in effect, seeing whether deviations from the trend in.the re- 
pression indicator Q/P predict significantly  deviation^ from the trend 
in the participants series. To some extent, this procedure will reduce 
the constraints on Q/P.due to the dependent variable P. 
Given that each series has a number of points which are distant 
outliers (1848, 1871, 1934 in the participants series and a number of 
peaks in the repression indicator)-.the trends in the two series could 
not be fitted with simple polynomial expressions in.time. Therefore, a. 
square root transformation was performed on each series to reduce the 
effects of the outliers which prevented fitting a simple trend expression. 
These transformed variables will be designated PTt and (Q/P)lt respec- 
tively. Both of these series were then detrended significantly by a second- 
order polynomial in time (t2 + t: a simple parabolic function of time). 
Our full model is therefore the following: 
2 
PIt = bo + bl(Q/P)It + alt + a2t + u(t); 
When the regression and'correlations are computed, we find: 
Multiple correlation coefficient: 0.6396 
Coefficient of Determination: 0.4091 = 29.3, p <.01 x 10 -12 F3. 127 . . 
Standard Error of Estimate:. 88.. 7.9.- 
The analysis of .variance for the multiple correlation is highly signifi- 
-12) cant (p < 0.01 x 10 , as is the coefficient of the repression indicator 
bl (p< 0.02 x 10 -12) . Although the trend terms t and t2 were. significantly 
different from zero in:detrending.the variables separately, in this model 
neither is significant.at the .05 level. One indication that this model 
fits the data well is that the serial correlation of the residuals is 
low (0.083), suggesting that this model accounts for most of the sys- 
tematic variation in the dependent variable. The. coefficient of the re- 
pression indicator (which was .highly significant) is negative, which con- 
firms our expectation of the relationship between violence and repression, 
noted above. 
A priori, we don't know whether or not there is a feedback effect 
of violence on repression or a lagged relationship between the variables. 
We cannot test the feedback effect.with the limited number of available 
variables, but one model.which does test a single.year lag between re- 
pression and violence is the following: 
2 + a t + a2t + u(t); Ptt = bo + bl(QIP) ' t-l 
When we compute the regress ion.and. .corre la t ions ,  we find: 
Multiple correlation coefficient: 0.3800 
Coefficient of determination: 0.1444 F3,126 = 7.09, p' ((0.02 x lom3) 
Standard error of estimate: 106..77 
The analysis of variance for the multiple.correlation coefficient is, 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.02 x 10 -3), as is the coefficient 
of the repression indicator (p{.0.004). Once again the relationship be- 
tween repression (lagged one year.here) and violence is negative. However, 
this lagged model does not fit .the.data so well as the preceding unlagged 
model, since in the 1agged.model.the coefficient of determination is lower, 
and the standard error of .estimate is higher. 
While a comparison.of the results of.testing the sets of,models 
representing the two theories (relative deprivation and relative ease 
of collective organization) certainly leads us to reject the former 
and to consider further the,latter; we are still interested in ascertain-' 
ing the relative effects of all our.independent variables in the same 
model. To remain consistent with our, analysis of relative deprivation, 
we use the first differences method on all the variables, and, to ascertain 
the relative weights of the independent variables, we compute standar- 
dized regression (Beta) coefficients. This model is then of the form: 
A Pt 
=,B o + B 1 t  A W  + B 2 A X  + B  b Yt + B4(d Q/P)t + ~(t); t .  3 
Where 
A Pt 9 ( b  Q/p), = Pt - pt_l,,- ,(Q/P)t - (QIP) t-l.i 
. , P = number of participants per.year. 
W = price of food index 
X = price of 'manufactured goods,index 
Y = index of industrial production 
Q =,number of.arrests per year 
t = time. 
u = error or residual term 
We compute the regression and correlations: 
Pt =0.034 + 0.0446 Wt +..0.085AXt - 0.0794Yt - 0.186 (DQ/P)~ +.u(t); 
~ultiple correlation coefficient: 0.2246 
Coefficient of determination: 0.0504 F4,103 = 1.36, p(0.25 
Standard.Error of estimate: 0.923 
Tha analysis of variance for the multiple correlation coefficient is not. 
significantly different.from zero.. Nor.are the coefficients of any of the 
independent variables except that of our repression indicator (p 0.04). 
Given the first difference method of detrending (which is consistent 
with the relative deprivation argument but not necessarily with the ease- 
of-organization argument) the repression indicator explains a smaller 
proportion of the variance in this .model. Nevertheless, the repression 
indicator is still the. only significant predictor in the model; its weight 
is more than,two times as large as that of the largest value for any of 
the measures of hardship. Once again, the sign of the coefficient of the 
repression indicator is in the. expected negative direction. 
.We.have.not, by any means, ruled out all plausible versions of the 
. . expectation-achievement explanation of collective violence. Given the 
multiplicity and looseness of the arguments scattered through the liter- 
ature, many further analyses of these and other variables representing 
expectations and achievements are still possible. We recommend, and intend 
to pursue, 1) tests to ascertain whether or not there is a feedback influence 
from violence to repression and, if so, how it operates; 2) other, more 
direct, representations of the "expectations" side of the argument; 3) 
the study of.other variables .representing mobilization, repression and 
the acquisition and loss of power .by major contenders; 4) testing of 
both families of models on other sets of data. Until we test the same 
models on other times.and places, some students of collective violence 
may prefer to hold on to expectation-achievement reasoning, arguing that 
France is an.exception, that Frenchmen are preternaturally responsive to 
repression and insensitive to hardship. That way of saving the hypothesis 
would have the virtue of novelty. For our part, however, the results 
of the time-series analysis-make.us increasingly doubtful that the expec- 
tation-achievement arguments concerning collective violence have much ex- 
planatory value. The most promising alternatives appear to lie in the 
analysis of struggles for power. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This paper.reports one part.0f.a continuing study of' the effects,of 
large-scale structural change on the character of political conflict in 
western Europe. The study is being.carried on in loose collaboration by 
a number of scholars at the University of Michigan, the University of 
Toronto, the ~estfglische Wilhelms-Universitgt (Mhster), and elsewhere. 
National Science Foundation grant GS-2674 currently .provides the principal 
financial support for the study. Grants from the Canada Council made 
earlier phases of the work possible. Recent statements and reports of 
findings appear in Lees and Tilly, 1972, Lodhi 1971, Rule and Tilly 1971, 
Shorter and Tilly 1971a, 197.1b and 1971c, C. Tilly 1970a, 1970b, 1972, 
L. ~ i ' l l ~  1971a and 1971b, R. Tilly 1970, R. Tilly and C. Tilly 1971. We 
are.gratefu1 to Pau1,Siegel for. criticism of.an earlier paper by Snyder 
on the same subject, and to Priscilla Cheever, Freddi Greenberg.and Glen 
Jones for assistance in assembling the data., 
2. I n t e l l i g e n t  reviews of t h e . l i t e r a t u r e  appear i n  Bienen 1968, Calhoun 
1970, Lupsha:1970, Nardin 1971, Nel-son 1970. Most of t h e  papers  c i t e d  i n  
no te  1 - a l s o  con ta in  d e t a i l e d  c r i t i c i s m s  of d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  cur- 
r e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  on p o l i t i c a l , c o n f l i c t  .and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  
3. We use t h e  commune-day.as ou r  b u i l d i n g  block.  France subdiv ides  i n t o  about 
38,000 commune?. I f  two o r  more even t s  meeting our  c r i t e r i a  occur  i n  
t h e  same commune ( i n  P a r i s ,  t h e  same q u a r t e r )  on t h e  same day, wi th  a 
reasonable presumption of  an over lap  of a t  l e a s t  t e n  percent  of t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  sma l l e r  even t ;  we t r e a t  them a s  p a r t s  of t h e  same-dis -  
turbance.  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  q u a l i f y i n g  even t s  occur  i n  ad j acen t  communes,or. 
on consecut ive days and t h e r e . i s  .a presumption of t e n  percent  ove r l ap ,  
they belong t o  t h e  saye  d is turbance .  By . these  r u l e s ,  over n ine- ten ths  of 
a l l  t h e  d i s tu rbances  f a l l  w i th in  a s i n g l e  commune and a s i n g l e  day. Ob- 
v i o u s l y ,  t h i s  procedure fragments l a r g e  sequences l i k e  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  of 
1848 i n t o  a cons ide rab le  number. of d i s tu rbances ,  and excludes t h e  non- 
v i o l e n t  days of t h e  r evo lu t ion  from cons ide ra t ion .  
4. We a r e  t a k i n g  .two s . teps-  which-should :make :it .eas ie ' r  f o r  o t h e r  s c h o l a r s  
...... . . t o  extend,  ve r t fy ;  .and .even. challenge-sur. . ,  own: .conclusions : 1) extending 
. . . t h e  t ime-ser ies  f i l e s .  f o r . t h e  131--y.ear..period t o  i nc lude  a f a r  l a r g e r  
range of - v a r i a b l e s  ; .2).  .deposi . t ing ,our . b a s i c .  ma.chine-readable f i l e s ,  i n -  
. . c1uding:-the.:time+series .f.ileS-,:witb..the. In te r -Univers i ty  Consortium f o r  
. . P o l i t i c a l  .Research f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n ;  most of t h e  f i l e s  should be a v a i l -  
a b l e  by. e a r l y  1973. 
5 .  Over t h e  131  y e a r s ,  r = .84. There were a mean 15.2 d i s tu rbances  
pe r  y e a r ,  w i th  a  s t anda rd  dev ia t ion  of 22.3, a  mean 24,198 p a r t i c i p a n t s  
p e r  y e a r ,  w i th  a s t anda rd  dev ia t ion -o f  45,641. 
6. The i n d u s t r i a l  production.-index g r a f t s  t h e  s e r i e s  i n  t h e  Annuaire 
s t a t i s t i q u e  -- de  l a  France,  rgsum6 r & t r o s p e c t i f ,  1966, p. 561 t o  t h e  s e r i e s  
f o r  1830 t o  1898 i n  ~ L v y - ~ e b o ~ e r  1968, t hus  covering t h e  y e a r s  1830-1913, 
1918-1938 and 1942-1960. The food index  g r a f t s  t h e  wholesale  p r i c e  i n -  
dex of t h e  Annuaire s t a t i s t i q u e ,  p. 373, f o r  1830-1860 t o  t h e  r e t a i l  
p r i c e  index  i n  ~ i n ~ e r - ~ g r e l  1961: 452-453 f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1860-1954. The 
manufactured goods index  g r a f t s  t h e  Annuaire s t a t i s t i q u e  wholesale  p r i c e  
index f o r  " i n d u s t r i a l  products"  i n  1830-1860 (p. 373) t o  t h e  r e t a i l  index 
f o r  1860-1940 and 1949-1954 i n  s i i g e r - ~ ; r e l  1961: 452-53. I n  each a n a l y s i s  
we used the.maximum number of yea r s  f o r  which t h e r e  were d a t a  f o r  a l l  t h e  
v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r .  model..being t e s t e d .  
7. Since t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h igh ,  i t  was p o s s i b l e  
t h g t  t h e  t r e n d  terms were .account ing  f o r  a  major p o r t i o n  of t h e  explained 
va r i ance  ; So, to . s e p a r a t e  t h e  .poss ib le  cpnfounding i n f l u e n c e  of time, 
we r e g r e s s e d ; f i r s t ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  s e r i e s  and, t hen ,  t h e  r a t i o  of 
a r r e s t s  t o  p a r t i c i p a n t s  on t h e - t r e n d  expres s ions ,  and c o r r e l a t e d  t h e  r e s id -  
u a l s .  Th i s  c o r r e l a t i o n  was -0.5903, which i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  t r end  terms 
were no t  a  m a j o r . i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  v a r i a t i o n  expla ined  by t h e  model. - 
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